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Ford Madox Ford has often been seen by critics as an author of
pure style, writing without philosophic underpinnings for his
impressionistic techniques. However, philosophy plays a large role
in Ford's work—as a foundation for both his themes and literary
theory. This philosophy, phenouenology--the metaphysics of individual
experience as opposed to universal determinism—came into existence
during Ford's lifetime. Though Ford may never have read in
phenomenology, his works reflect the movement both in what he writes,
by emphasising the individual over the communal experience, and how
he writes, using the idea of the neutral author to present objective
narration.
The first three chapters explore three of Ford's works--the fairy
tale The Queen Who Flew (1894), the novel The Good Soldier (1915), and
the tetralogy Parade's End (1924-1928)—and show a growth of
phenomenological thought within each. Starting with The Queen Who 
Flew, Ford portrays the first principle of phenomenology, the iaportance
of individual perspective, a principle found in the early phenomenology
of Edmund Husserl. In The Good Soldier, a second stage of phenomenology.
Martin Heidegger's discovery of the underlying void and apparent
meaninglessness of life, can be seen. Third, Jean-Paul Sartre's ideas













The final chapter applies phenomenology to Ford's literary theory,
an early version of reader-response criticism, a literary school of
thought which comes from phenomenological philosophy. Three central
relationships appear in Ford's critical writings: the relationship
between the writer and the word, epitoaised by the removal of authorial
presence; the relationship between the reader and the writer, marked
by humbleness on the part of the writer; and the relationship between
the reader and the word, a relationship based on surprise. Etch of
these relate back to Ford's major intent, to become the neutral
author. Ford's criticism shows his consciously applying the basic
ideas of phenomenology to his own writing, allowing readers to arrive













To Dr. Dorothy McMahon, ay thesis director, for arguing with
se, prodding as, disagreeing with as, and believing in se--and Ford
Madox Ford (as such as she could). I have written this essay, but











It is true there are no villans in the world; you have the sense to
see that I, who an an Anarchist, a destroyer, as not, when the
shouting is over, ethically a bit worse than Mr. Cecil Rhodes who is
an Empire Builder.
Ford Madox Ford, in an undated
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If anything at all, the central these to this essay is that
Ford Madox Ford is not a %turf. In a recent issue of Channels,
journal on electronic communications, Walter Karp writes about the
new cartoon heros--written as plural because the individual hero no
longer exists in children's television. Instead, there are the
Ssurfs. Ssurfs, according to Karp, exist as purely social creatures,
only able to survive as members of a community. If a Smurf strikes
out on his in (there turns out to be only one female Smurf, Ssurfette,
so that the masculine pronoun becomes appropriate), it is only to
learn that he can not live without the gifts others give to his
("Where the Do-Gooders Went Wrong," Channels, 4, No. 1 [19643, 41-4?).
As I watched a few minutes of the Smarts myself on television the
other morning, I was struck by the fact that the heroic deed of the
day was performed by Lazy Smurf, whose snoring saves a group of these
blue-faced creatures who are trapped underground. The lesson to be
learned, as told by Papa Smurf, is that now we can see how everybody
has a natural talent which has been given by nature to help the
community in some way.
But what do Ssurfs have to do with Ford Madox Ford? The one
theme that runs throughout Ford's works is the importance of the
individual over communal concerns. Without the individual, the
community becomes Oceania of 12§17--a well oiled machine nobody can













that no one subscribe to individual ideas, because individual ideas
might run against those adopted by the community as a whole. Ford's
vision, however, works because thinking individuals separate
themselves from the community in order to have personal existence,
to have individual meanings for their lives.
A possible reason for Ford's lack of acceptance in modern
criticism may be that his emphasis on individuality carries over
into his aesthetic. The idea of a universal truth expressed through
art can not exist for Ford if all people are to define themselves as
individual beings rather than as social creatures. Therefore, Ford's
aesthetic must be one of presenting the most objective picture
possible, leaving interpretations of truths to the reader. This lack
of an argument for a universal philosophy leaves literary critics
puzzled. "If a writer removes the philosophic argument, what is
there to critique?" they ask.
Ford is not a literary photographer, however. There is a
philosophic argument in his work. On two different levels Ford
presents a world of ideas--ideas to be discussed, argued, accepted,
rejected, transformed, and used. The first level is in the minds of
his characters. In the epigram to this essay, Ford writes in a letter
to John Galsworthy that "there are no villans in the world," leaving
all people, as individuals, to be heros. Each character in Ford's
works represents a world view, and each of these can be seen as a
certain perception of truth. Through this fora of pluralism,
philosophy is presented. In the essay that follows. I have attempted













world view. However, even though one character may act as spokesperson
for Ford himself, this does not mean that Ford believes all people
live by the truths this character expresses. Instead, it is only
one world view among many--no more right or wrong than the others.
The second location for Ford's world view is in the method and
techniques Ford applies in writing his works. The objectivism and
pluralism in Ford's novels hold certain implications about the
nature of the universe. Objectivity implies, again, pluralism,
individuality, through the absence of judgement. Though a bit more
obscure, these implied ideas are as important for arriving at a
world view for Ford as are the actual words of his texts. The cliched
way of expressing this goes, "Ford's medium is his message."
One final location of ideas for Ford's world picture should
not be overlooked--his own critical writings. Rich and varied, within
then can be found explanations for all the ideas presented in the
rest of Ford's writings.
The actual method used to explore Ford's philosophical program
in this essay is quite simple. First, three works from three
different periods in Ford's life are examined--The queen Who Flew 
(1894), The Good Soldier (1915), and Parade's End (1924-1928)—
showing how each portrays a different version of phenomenology, the
philosophical school of thought coming into being during Ford's lifetime.
The final chapter discusses Ford's critical writings in light of
reader-response criticism, the school of literary criticism which
comes from phenomenology. In various places throughout the text,
general overviews of phenomenology are given in order to aquaint the













One final note needs to be made. As I did my research, I felt
perhaps the days of treating Ford criticism as an act of apologetics--
trying to apologize for Ford's impressionistic techniques, exaggerated
imagination, seemingly simplistic style, etc.--were over. However,
the most recent study of Ford's works. Ann Barr Snitow's Ford Madox 
Ford and the Voice of Uncertainty (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984), once again looks at Ford as a man who
didn't quite understand all he was doing. (A typical comment reads,
Ford "is at his best only when irony undercuts and complicates his
tragicomic dream of feudal society" (p. 71.) Once again, Ford's
objective presentation and pluralism are misconstrued for a lack of
a workable vision. This essay attempts a beginning at correcting
that view of Ford.
With all this said, I would like to begin this inquiry into the
philosophy behind the writings of Ford Madox Ford with his own words,
written in that same letter to Galsworthy mentioned earlier:
When one reads a book one is algays wondering more or less
what kind of man the writer is--its writer be it said. In
this ease the writer is all right; speaks with a right sort
of voice; has things to say worth listening to; has a
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The Queen Who Flew and News From Nowhere
The late eighteen hundreds was a time rich in Utopian visions
of the world. Among these was William Morris's News Prom Nowhere 
(1891), a picture of England in the undated future, turned into a
pastoral cornucopia of good will, free love, and social equality of
all people--men and women, rich and poor. This pastoral vision is
similar to that of many people in Morris's circle, in particular one
young writer named Ford Madox Hueffer. Hueffer, or as he later
became known, Ford Madox Ford, was the grandson of the Pre-Raphaelite
painter Ford Madox Brown; therefore, he was surrounded by many of
the great artists of the period--D. G. Rossetti, Christina Rossetti,
Algernon Charles Swinburne, and, of course, William Morris. Beyond
being the people who physically surrounded Ford in his youth, they
were also a major intellectual influence on the budding writer.
Still, Ford did not accept all of the Pre-Raphaelite teachings as
gospel truth. A close examination of Ford's earliest works, his
fairy tales, and in particular The Queen Who Flew (1894), will reveal
not only the pastoral vision of Utopia the young Ford shared with
Morris, but also the metaphysical difference with which Ford
approaches his vision.
The Queen Who Flew
1 
tells the story of a young Queen who has













anyone except servants and continually changing Regents, who gain
power only through constant overthrows of one another, and who are
continually coming to the Queen with papers for her to sign (despite
the fact that she does not know what they are for). One night, as
the Queen finds herself sitting in the garden alone during another
military overthrow, she strikes up a conversation with a bat, through
which the Queen learns the secret of flying and, with her new found
powers, takes off over the castle wall, having a variety of adventures--
with her subjects in the town; with the king of the neighboring
country; with a witch, Satan, and some enchanted geese; and ultimately
with a blind young man and his mother in a land across the sea.
The most important of the adventures in The Queen Who Flew is
this final one, the Queen's encounter with the blind young man and
his mother. The Queen lands, after an Icarian attempt to fly to
the sun, finding herself on a hill above a young farmer tilling his
fields alone. The Queen helps the young farmer plow his last furrow
for the day, and he invites her to eat supper at his cottage. On
the way, the Queen discovers that this agile young man is blind.
After meeting his mother, the Queen becomes like a member of the
family and stays with then for over a year. At the end of that time,
the Queen decides to journey back to her kingdom, remembering that
the bat who taught her how to fly had also mentioned a cure for
blindness. The Queen arrives in her kingdom only to discover that
the Regent has announced he will be marrying the Queen in a private













fraud the Regent is, gets the blindness cure from the bat, and sets
the bat up as ruler of the kingdom. Returning to the young farmer
and his mother, the Queen brews the wind-flower crown she wears to
make her fly (the cure for blindness being wind-flower tea), heals
the young man's eyes, marries him, and lives happily ever after.
Ford's Utopian world in this last section of The Queen Who Flew 
compares directly in many ways to Morris's vision in News From 
Nowhere.2 Most obviously, of course, both Utopias are pastoral
visions. In News From Nowhere, the great cities have been razed
and restructured as villages and towns. They are still the largest
population centers, but the population in each has been greatly
reduced. The pastoral vision of The Queen Who Flew shows in that
the only Utopia described exists as the blind man's farm. The only
urban scenes occur in the city surrounding the Queen's castle, scenes
of corruption and revolution.
Another similartity between The Queen Who Flew and News From 
Nowhere is the treatment of capitalism and commerce in both works.
Upon his arrival in the future, Morris's Guest takes a boat out on
the Thames to go swimming. Returning to shore. the Guest attempts
to pay the oars-man for his services. The oars-man refuses,
puzzled at first, but soon recognizing the Guest as a stranger,
unaware of the pure communism that has been adopted by England
(pp. 6-10). A parallel scene occurs in The Queen Who Flew when the
Queen first meets the blind young farmer and he offers her supper.












the farmer answers (p. 55). Again, when the Queen first meets the
farmer's mother, she indirectly thanks the woman for taking her in
without payment;
The Queen said, "Yes, I am a little tired;
very kind of you to let me stop."
The little old woman looked at her with an
look in her gentle eyes.





There is good reason for the Queen's naivete about money and hospitality
in this new land. Since leaving the castle garden, the Queen has
net several people asking to be paid, in some form or another, for
services they provide.
In the first of these encounters, the Queen enters a honey-cake
maker's shop, asks for, and receives, several cakes, all of which
she Immediately eats. The Queen, however, is not ready for what
comes next--the honey-cake maker asks for payment. Since the Queen
has never been outside the castle walls and has never had any money
of her own, she is confused and doesn't know what to do. Only when
the honey-cake maker realizes that, with the Queen's permission, he
can advertise as "'JAMES GRUBB, / Honey-cake Maker,' / 'to her
Majesty the Queen and the R-----'" is the Queen's debt to the tradesman
considered paid (pp. 17-20). The Queen has lost her innocence about
commerce and begun her capitalistic education.
The second part of the Queen's economic education also has
overtones of commerce and capitalistic ways--her encounter with the













Who Flew. the Queen lands by a cottage where an old woman lives.
The Queen asks the woman for something to eat, to which the old
woman replies, "And what will you pay me?" (p. 32). The queen,
having no money, agrees to do a day's work herding the woman's geese
in return for food. As it turns out, the geese are enchanted and
unherdable, at which point the old woman reveals herself as a witch,
one who wants to eat the Queen for supper. The Queen escapes the
old woman (another story in itself) and returns to the cottage to
live.
The Queen encounters commerce once more when she has her run-in
with the devil, who, in a Faustian scene, appears at the cottage and
makes a fool of himself, mistaking the Queen for the old woman,
believing that the elixer of love and youth he had left the witch
worked miracles. Realising his mistake, the devil makes a fool of
himself again by falling in love with the Queen, who has been
drinking this elixer of love without knowing it. Finally, this
foolish devil decides to make the Queen a commercial proposal.
"But if you won't marry me, madaa, perhaps we can do a little business
in my line. I pride myself that my system is the very best--the
seven years' purchase system, you know. . . . Come, let se fill you
up a form" (p. 47).
Commerce and the capitalism that accompanies it act not just as
a central focus, but also as a good joke in both The Queen Who Flew 
and News From Nowhere. The outdated ideas of money and trade are













Guest offers the oarsman money, and after the oarsman realizes
what has happened, the Guest receives a joyful explanation from the
man that "if one person gave me something, then another might, and
another, and so on; and I hope you won't think me rude if I say that
I shouldn't know where to stow away so many mementos of friendship"
(p. 10). Ford, in his own way, makes light of the system of
capitalism, associating it with the totally corrupt society that the
Queen leaves in her homeland, with the old witch and her enchanted
geese, and ultimately with a very silly Faustian devil. Ford sight
as well have been talking about money as love (a comparison that
Morris makes that will be discussed below) when, in a terrible pun.
Ford has the Queen ask the witch's birds, newly disenchanted and
turned back into the men they were who had come for the elixer, "Dear
me! . . . Does love make such geese of people?" (p. 50).
Not only as pastoral and communistic visions, however. do Ford's
and Morris's Utopias parallel one another. The governing method of
the ideal world is similar in both as well-,anarchy. In News From 
Nowhere, Morris envisions the abolishment of all types of political
boundaries, the largest being international boundaries between nations.
With this abolition, a national governing body is no longer needed.
The disdain Morris feels for even an elected national ruling body
such as Parliament shows when his future Utopia turns the House of
Lords and the House of Commons into a municipal storehouse for manure.
There are still differences of opinion that need settling in Morris's
Utopia (such as when to cut the hay, etc.), but these decisions are











majority rule system (pp. 85,90). Morris's Utopia sees large
governing bodies as artificial, and the politics they argue as
equally artificial.
The Queen Who Flew has a similar idea of how a government should
work. First, Ford makes fun of the constant revolutions in the
Queen's homeland, highlighted by the fact that the best ruler turns
out to be the bat the Queen puts in power, a symbol of both nature
and blindness--two important traits for any ruler, if there is to be
a ruler at all. Second, there is Ford's Utopia, the country where
the blind farmer lives. (Again, note the idea of blindness.) After
the Queen eats dinner the first night with the young man and his
mother, she has the following conversation with them:
"But what is the land called, and who rules it?" the
Queen said.
The ploughman laughed. "Why, it is called the land
of the Happy Folks and as for who rules it, it gets along
very well as it is." (P. 59)
In Ford's Utopian vision, anarchy is the only possible form of
government that can work. Any other form is artificial, for as the
farmer says, "it gets along very well as it is" without help from
rulers of any sort.
This is the Victorian Ford, the child growing up in the
Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, sharing with the artists of his grandfather's
circle a pastoral vision of beauty, one that can best be found through
socialism and anarchy. Though this is a shared vision with Morris,
it does not give the complete picture of what the young Ford is
0
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thinking. Only by exploring the metaphysical underpinnings driving
each writer's vision can their differences be found. And they are
vast differences--the differences between a modern and a Victorian
mind.
It is appropriate at this point to include a short introduction
to phenomenology, the philosophic school of thought that will be
attached to the works of Ford Madox Ford. Quite possibly, Ford
never read the phenomenological philosophers. Even though Edmund
Husserl, the father of phenomenology, is a contemporary of Ford's
(Husserl: 1859-1938; Fords 1873-1939), Husserl's major works were
not translated into English until Ford was well into a phenomenological
pattern of thought. The assertion made by attaching the ideas of
phenomenology to the writings of Ford Madox Ford is for phenomenology
as a worldwide modern idea, whether as an organised worldwide movement
or not.3
Phenomenology, as a philosophy, has three root sources: the
Aristotelian method of discovery, the Cartesian man, and Kant's
Copernican revolution. The first root, Aristotle's method of discovery,
is the simplest idea to explain.
There are two possible methods for discovery. One is to make
a claim, then to find all experiences that fit within the realm of
that claim. For example, the claim may be made that sneakers are
canvas shoes with rubber soles worn while engaged in a sporting event.
With a specific definition in Rind, observers can attach the title
9
sneaker to any object that fits the definition. First the concept
is arrived at, then real world objects are classified according to
that concept.
The second possible method of discovery, the inverse of the
first, is the Aristotelian method, which, instead of taking a
concept and fitting experience to it, experiences the world and then
forms concepts out of what is observed. "The natural path of
investigation starts from what is more readily knowable and more
evident to us although intrinsically more obscure, and proceeds
toward what is sore self-evident and intrinsically more intelligible,"
writes Aristotle.
4 
Aristotle believes that the proper method of
discovery is to form understandable abstractions about life from the
actual experiences of life itself. An observer would view all types
of shoes, their construction and use, then arrive at a definition
of sneaker from observations rather than from pure abstract thought.
It is this observation then abstraction method of discovery that the
phenomenologist will adopt.
The second root concept of phenomenology, the concept of Cartesian
man, states that a person knows one thing, that he or she exists--"I
think, therefore I am." Unlike Descartes, the phenomenologist will
not use this proposition to attempt a proof of existence beyond the
individual mind. Phenosenology accepts man as a creature who has a
certain existence, what Descartes calls thinking, but beyond that
there is nothing sure in the world, there is nothing provable. Even
if a sneaker has a certain existence, that existence holds no
10
importance in the phenomenological method. The only important fact
is that the mind perceives the sneaker.5 It believes that it has
encountered the sneaker.6
The third root concept of phenosenology is closely allied to
the Cartesian man--Kant's Copernican revolution. As Copernicus
solved the problem of planetary motion by changing his perspective
from geo-centricity to hello-centricity, Kant changed the perspective
of metaphysics from an object-centered view to a mind-centered view.
Before Kant, metaphysics concentrated on the nature of the objects
being observed--a good metaphysician would be attempting a definition
of "sneakerness," trying to discover what in a sneaker's physical
construct makes it a sneaker. Kant says that it is not the sneaker
a metaphysician need worry about, but instead how that sneaker is
perceived. Kant writess
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must
conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge
of objects by establishing something in regard to then
a priori., by means of concepts, have, on this assumption,
ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we
say not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if
we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge.7
Kant does not say that the physical objects of the world actually
mutate and change according to what occurs in the human mind, but
that people only know perceptions of objects, and these perceptions
must conform to the knowledge people already possess. When Cartesian
man perceives the sneaker, he fits that perception into the structural
limitations already found in the mind. Phenomenologists will accept
ant's Copernican revolution as the basis for metaphysics, but again,
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as with Descartes, they will not use this information for further
proofs of deeper knowledge. Kant uses the revolution to show the
existence of certain a priori knowledge in the human mind. The
phenoaenologist rejects this proof, claiming that there is no a priori,
knowledge, only a posteriori or empirical knowledge. The sneaker has
no existence to the human mind until it is experienced, until it is
perceived.
What is phenomenology, then? From Aristotle, phenomenologist&
have taken an empirical method of observation; from Descartes, the
idea of self; from Kent, the idea that the proper study of philosophy
is the way people perceive the world, not the actual world itself.
It is an empirical philosophy, but unlike earlier empiricists,
phenomenologist& observe perceptions instead of objects, saying that
all people know are their perceptions—,and perceptions can only be
known once they are perceived. A sneaker has no knowable existence
until I perceive it.
8 
I do not know if the sneaker existed before;
I can not be sure that it exists now. Whether it truly exists, i.e.
exists in a physical form, is not important. What is important is
that I perceive a sneaker. That perception is what I an able to
base my knowledge on.
A major split between early phenomenology and existentialism
arises at this point. Husserl will claim that through perception
the phenomenological method uncovers universals--the existence of
"essence" or the ideal structure. Looking at the sneaker, an
observer comes to some meaning of what a sneaker is, Husaerl's
12
essence of the sneaker. (For Husserl, the essence of man is
perception.) The existentialist does not believe in this found
meaning but instead believes the observer creates meanings. People
make, rather than discover, the definition of sneaker. Husseralian
phenomenology sees man as a creature who questions and discovers;
existential phenomenology sees man as a creative being. One other
form of phenomenology exists between these two, that of Heidegger,
which states that people neither discover nor create but only interact
with the phenomena that surround thes. At this point none of these
propositions will either be accepted or rejected. Only the act of
perception itself will be explored.9
One other aspect of phenomenology needs mentioning, the idea of
time and mutability. To this point, phenosenology has been discussed
only in relationship to space, a static definition of people and
their existence. However, people live not only in space, but also in
time; time allows for a dynastic process, allows for change. A
perception exists only for one moment, but experience is more than
momentary perception. There also exists the memory of perception--
reflection. Because people not only perceive the world but also
reflect on those perceptions, the structure the mind uses to
understand the world must change in accordance with these internal
changes. I say view a sneaker through my static definition, arrived
at earlier through experience, of canvas shoes with rubber soles
worn while engaged in a sporting event. This definition works until
I encounter a leather or nylon sneaker. At this point I restructure
my thinking to include nylon running shoes in my definition. My
13
thoughts are not static. As I reflect on my old observations about
sneakers and add my new perception, the structure of my thinking
changes.
Phenomenology works as a dynaaic process of perception and
reflection. The importance of this idea to art will be detailed in
the final chapter on reader-response criticise, but it should be noted
hare that the application of this process is not limited merely to
sneakers. It implies that a work of art, if seen as the perception
of an object rather than the object itself, is not static but
dynamic. A work of art is continually perceived then reflected on,
and through this process, the thought structures of observers
continually change. Readers bring life to books. By actively
reflecting on the words they read, people give meaning to a work.
It is this active involvement of the reader in the process of art
that phenomenology highlights for the literary critic.
Ford Madox Ford's father, scholar and music critic Francis
Hueffer, came to England from Germany in 1868 with letters of
introduction from the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. Among these
was one adressed to Thomas Carlyle, the British philosopher who
becalm Francis Hueffer's entree to Pre-Raphaelite society.1° In
aany ways, Schopenhauer and Carlyle represent the epitome of
nineteenth-century philosophy. Schopenhauer, in particular,
represents the nineteenth-century idea of fate as the driving force
behind people and the Universe.
Through his writing, Schopenhauer moved philosophy into the
14
realm of pessimistic fatalism. As Frederick Copleston interprets
Schopenhauer in A History of Philosophy: "Knowledge is the servant
of the will. Or, to onit metaphysics for the present, knowledge is
in the first instance the instrument of satisfying physical needs,
the servant of the body."11 It is will that controls people.
Knowledge, the intellect, can help interpret the actions of the will
and give advice (but not orders) on what a person should do in life,
but intellect does not control a person. Will does.
The nature of will in Schopenhauer is important as well.
Individuals, according to Schopenhauer, do not have their own special
wills, only Will. Individuality is only the physical manifestation
of the one universal Will. As Johannes Hirschberger explains
Schopenhauer in The History of Philosophy:
If the will must reveal itself, it can do so only by
making itself an individual. by "individuation." The
principle of this individuation is apace and tine. The
result is that all things in time and space are thrown
into turmoil, are eternally unsated, and are eternally
unhappy, because each one of then seeks to be the cosmic
will.1Z
Schopenhauer has taken life's meaning and purpose out of the
individual's hands and put it into a communal spirit that creates
individuals only as physical aanifestations of itself. Schopenhauer
has United, if not destroyed, the act of individual free will.
People act only under the received motivations of a universal driving
mechanism.
Carlyle, too, writes about a transcendental driving a:eche:mien
that all people bow to, which goes by the name of Force:
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This Universe, ah se—what could the wild man know of it;
what can we yet know? That it is s Force, and a thousandfold
Complexity of Forces; a Force which is not we. TO4t is all;
it is not we, it is altogether different from
Carlyle. like Schopenhauer, regards people not only as small cage in
a universal machine, but as cogs that have no say in what function
they will perform. This idea of fatalism, of the inevitable outcome
in history, occurs not just in these two philosophers, but enters
into the works of many other thinkers.
Most significant among nineteenth-century proponents of the
universal driving mechanism were the socialists, including Karl
Marx, but other forms of socialism rose alongside Marxism. Not all
thinkers agreed with the economic emphasis that Marx placed on his
philosophy. Among these dissenters was William Morris, who had
formed his own socialist ideals before reading Marx. Morris does
not base his Utopian vision on economic equality (though he does not
exclude it either), but instead on an aesthetic principle closely
allied to that of Ruskin.
14 
Morris writes of people whose only
desires are for the most beautiful objects. News From Nowhere 
describes the quest for a universal idea of beauty. Still, universal
beauty works no less as a driving mechanism than does universal
economics. They are simply different interpretations of the same
universal will.
The consequences of Morris's philosophy of universals are a
united purpose for all people and, at the same time, the destruction
of the solitary person. The first of these consequences, a united
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philosophy of life, shows in the criminal system Morris creates for
his Utopia. Crimes, for Morris, are the outward symptoms of disease,
not conscious acts of violence:
"And lesser outbreaks of violence," said I, "how do
you deal with them? . . ."
Said Hammonds "If the ill-doer is not sick or mad (in
which case he must be restrained till his sickness or madness
is cured) it is clear that grief and humiliation must follow
the ill deed; and society in general will make that pretty
clear to the ill-doer if he should chance to be dull to
it. . . ."
"So," said I, "you consider crime a mere spasmodic
disease, which requires no body of criminal law to deal
with it?"
"Pretty such so," said he; "and since, as I have told
you, we are a healthy people generally, so we are not likely
to be troubled with this disease." (p. 83)
Crime, according to Morris, lives far removed from the normal human
mind. Even if crime does occur in people who are not sick, it occurs
when they become "momentarily overcome by wrath or folly" (p. 83),
and people will quite naturally feel remorse over their actions.
Passions, "wrath or folly," as the greatest threat to the goodness
of society lead into the second consequence of Morris's universal
will, the denial of the solitary person. A specific example rather
than an abstract statement works to illustrate Morris's idea. In
the passion aroused by romantic love, Morris sees the ego in its
worst state. After the Guest consents to his guide about the beautiful
woman whom they have just left their horse with, the guide comments
on the romantic situation of News From Nowhere:
"Well, so she is beautifui.3," said he. "Tie a good job
there are so many of then that every Jack may have his
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Jill, else I fear that we should get fighting for them.
Indeed," said he becoaing very grave, "I don't say that
it does not happen even now, sometiaes. For you know love
is not a very reasonable thing, and self-will is commoner
than some of our moralists think." (P. 35)
In romantic love, Morris finds the greatest evil, the greatest threat
to his Utopian vision. Love threatens because its actions are
ego-centric; they are assertions of self-will. Self-mill, individualism,
can not be allowed if a truly universal philosophy is to exist.
Morris takes self-will beyond the realm of romantic love and goes
on to show self-will as the root evil for all major problems. As the
Guest continues in his learning adventures, he meets with his guide's
uncle, old Hammond. Hammond and the Guest have a lengthy discussion,
Including a history lesson on how the revolution which set up Morris's
Utopia case abouts
Looking back now, we can see that the great motive-power
of the change was a longing for freedom and equality, akin
if you please to the unreasonable passion of the lover; a
sickness of the heart that rejected with loathing the aimless
solitary life of the well-to-do educated man of tat
time. . . . Well these men tthe early socialistsJ, though
conscious of this feeling, had no faith in it, as a means of
bringing about the change. Nor was that wonderful, for
looking around then they saw the huge mass of the oppressed
classes too such burdened with the misery of their 11---,
and too such -.erwhelmed by the selfishness of misery. . . .
(pp. 104-105)
In Morris's view, selfishness is the world's greatest evil; it points
toward ego-centricity and ego-centricity means that a universal ideal
can not be at work. Without the universal ideal, the universal driving
mechanism, News From Nowhere and the Utopian vision it presents would
be no more than Morris's dream--nice but impossible. Therefore,
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Morris has no choice but to rid his Utopia of its worst enemy, the
solitary man, the individual with an individual will. Only the
nineteenth-century ideal of the universal will can bring about
Morris's Utopia.
Even though Ford's Utopia in The Queen Who Flew appears physically
sinilar to that of Morris in News From Nowhere, Ford takes a different
spiritual approach to the problems of perfecting the world. In
answering the basic setaphysical question of where meaning for the
universe cones from, Ford diverges from both his father's influence--
through Schopenhauer and Carlyle-,and his grandfather's—through
Morris. Ford does not portray a world run by a universal driving
mechanism but instead puts the individual above the ordinary workings
of the world, allowing, even forcing, people to find meaning for their
own lives within themselves rather than in some outside force.
In The Queen Who Flew, when the bat reveals the secret of flight
to the Queen, he also presents the idea that people are what they
make of themselves by repeating to the Queen that She won't be able
to fly if she keeps supposing that she can't. "Half the evils in the
world come from people supposing," the bat says (p. 4). The Queen
still does not understand the bat's message, so she asks his again
if she, too, could learn to fly:
"Well, it certainly won't be if you suppose you can't,"
the bat said. "Now, when I was a mouse, I used to suppose
I couldn't fly, and so, of course, I couldn't. But, one
day, I saved the life of a cockchafer that had got into a
beetle-trap, and he told as how it was to be managed."
(p. 4)
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The bat tells the Queen she has control over her own life, over what
she will be and over what she will make of the world. Just as the
bat learned to fly once he stopped supposing it impossible, so too
can the Queen stop supposing it impossible for her to learn how to
fly. The self-imposed strictures of thinking must be removed to open
up the infinite possibilities available to the individual.
The bat repeats this lesson again when he tells the Queen that
the secret to flight is found in a flower:
"Yes; but I shall have to travel over so many mountains
and rivers and things before I can find it," the Queen said
dismally.
"How do you know that?" the bat asked sharply.
"I don't know it, I only suppose it; at least I've
read it in books."
"Well, of course, if you go supposing things and reading
then in books. I can't do anything for you," the bat said.
(p. 6)
According to the bat, the Queen's chance to sake something of her life,
whether through flying or something else, will cone only when she
stops supposing things to be true and restructures her thinking to be
open to new possibilities. The Queen's hope lies first in accepting
an Aristotelian method of discovery, to observe life before forming
ideas about it. Second, hope rests in the Queen's acceptance of cantrol
over her own life. To this point, the queen has allowed outside forces
to control her life--from Regents to books. The Queen must form her
own ideas about the meaning of life, no longer accepting the universal
truths given to her, the supposings of others, and finding her own
meanings, her own universal truths to live by. The bat tells the
Queen she must become a phenomenological individual.
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The rest of The Queen Who Flew consists of the Queen's experiences
once she learns to fly, ending with her marriage to the farmer.
Here, again, Ford splits with Morris on metaphysical grounds. For
Morris, the greatest threat to Utopian existence is an emphasis on
romantic love and the necessary ego-centricity of such a passion.
The Queen Who Flew, however, concludes with the traditional fairy
tale "they lived happily ever after": "But next day, Eldrida and
her love were married, and, from that time forth, they worked together,
and went hand in hand up the tranquil valley or in among the storms
on the hill crests, and so lived happily ever after" (p. 82). In the
marriage of the Queen (who in the Utopian atmosphere of the farm has
decided to go by her given name, Eldrida, rather than by her title)
and the young farmer, Ford highlights the goodness of love. Love
takes the Queen back to her homeland in search of the cure for
blindness. Love allows her to give up the throne in order to stay
with the farmer and his mother. This does not say that Ford has
forgotten the silliness of the men turned into enchanted geese, all
of whom were in search of love. With Ford's emphasis on individuals'
taking life into their awn hands and giving it meaning for themselves,
love, even romantic love, can have two different meanings for two
different individuals. Love takes on different meanings as different
people perceive it through their awn experiences and thought patterns
There remains one last important detail to be discussed in light
of the difference between Morris's and Ford's metaphysical approaches
to Utopia--anarchy. For Morris, anarchy works because the world has
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its own universal driving mechanism, an aesthetic principle which
resides within all people. Anarchy is necessary in order to allow
that aesthetic to work without the artificial restraints of politics
and government. But if, as Ford claims, meaning comes from inside
individuals, not from external forces, there can be no underlying
mechanism that will replace politics in an anarchist's world. Why
rid Utopia of government, then? Only conjecture is possible; however,
if Ford believes that meaning comes from within individuals, then
the abolishment of government only reinforces the idea of individual
freedom. To restrain people under some limited political system is
to limit the infinite possibilities open to them. Anarchy, from a
phenomenological view, affirms the importance of the individual will
instead of accepting a universal driving mechanism.
The Queen Who Flew owes much to Ford's Victorian Pre-Raphaelite
upbringing. Like many of those who surrounded him, the young Ford
takes on a pastoral vision of Utopia. And, like the newly founded
socialist parties and organizations of the late eighteen hundreds,
Ford uses communism and anarchy at, the basis for his own Utopian
vision. But Ford makes one major break with his Victorian past, a
break that brings him closer to the moderns of the early twentieth
century. The Queen Who Flew is an affirmation of the individual over
the universe, not the universe over the individual.
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The Good Soldiers A Picture Without a Meaning
Ford Madox Ford's self-proclaimed tours de force, The Good 
Soldier,1 is also his bleakest novel. The story of a man learning
to deal with the memories of the people among whom he has lived
for the past twelve years, The Good Soldier works as an epistemological
study on how the human mind can come to accept the inadequacies of
human understanding. Even though epistemology works as an entree
to Ford's novel, beneath this act of comprehension lies a deeper
structure--a metaphysical picture of the world as a whole. Ford's
world view in The Good Soldier can be seen as a bleak picture which
takes Husserl's phenomenology of essences a step further down to
Heidegger's pure phenomenology, a world without meaning--either
discovered or created--a world of pure phenomenological interaction.
The two seminal studies of epistemology in The Good Soldier,
Samuel Hynes's "The Epistemology of The Good Soldier"2 and Paul B.
Armstrong's "The Epistemology of The Good Soldier: A Phenomenological
Heconsideration,"3 both argue for a shift in interpreting Ford's
novel. Most earlier critics raise moral and/or philosophic questions
about the characters The Good Soldier's first-person narrator, Dowell,
describes, or they deal with the reliability of Dowell as a narrator for
the events of the story (what of his tale can be believed?). But
with the appearance of epistemological criticism on The Good Soldier,
something similar to Kant's Copernican revolution occurs. Instead
25
of concentrating on the objects Dowell talks about in his narrative,
the critic must now concentrate on how Dowell sees and understands
these objects. Unlike the first-person narrator in Charles Dickens's
David Copperfield who steps back in order to relate objectively the
facts of his tale, Dowell continually reminds the reader of his
presence. Dowell says to the reader at the story's starts "It is
not unusual in human beings who have witnessed the sack of a city or
the falling to pieces of a people to desire to set down what they
have witnessed . . just to get the sight out of their heads" (p. 5).
Even at the book's end. Dowell's act of narration continues to be a
part of his story: "I as writing this. now, I should say, a full
eighteen months after the words that end my last chapter" (p. 233).
One way to describe the difference between the two works, then,
might be to call David Copperfield object-centered and The Good 
Soldier subject or mind-centered.
The method Ford uses to mind-center The Good Soldier becomes
indicative of the novel's epistemology--two key phrases give a
general picture of what occurs in Dowell's mind. The first phrase,
a question raised by Dowell, serves as an introduction to the entire
novel. "If for nine years I have possessed a goodly apple that is
rotten at the core," asks Dowell, "and discover its rottenness only
in nine years and six months less four days, isn't it true to say
that for nine years I possessed a goodly apple?" (p. 7). Is it true?
Answering this question becomes The Good Soldier's first problem.
Dowell must decide if he can gain some idea of what truth is. By
asking the question of the apple and its core, Dowell has already
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come to realise that truth is not found in the physical objects people
perceive. Dowell lived believing that his relationship with his
wife, Florence, and the Ashburnhams was of the finest kind:
Permanence? Stability? I can't believe that it's gone.
I can't believe that that long, tranquil life, which was
just stepping the minuet, vanished in four crashing days
at the end of nine years and six weeks. Upon ay word,
yes, our intimacy was like a ainuet, simply because on
every possible occasion and in every possible circumstance
we knew where to go, where to sit, which table we unaniaously
should choose. . . . (p. 6)
As long as Dowell saw his world as a minuet, it was a minuet.
Permanence and stability did exist and are lost only after reflection,
after time plays its tricks.
Shortly after calling his relationship a minuet, Dowell claims
that it wasn't a minuet but a prison, but then he comes to this
conclusion:
And yet I swear by the sacred name of ay creator that it
was true. It was true sunshine; the true music; the true
plash of the fountains from the mouth of stone dolphins.
For, if for me we were four people with the sane tastes,
with the same desires, acting--or, no, not acting—sitting
here and there unanimously, isn't that the truth? (p. 7)
Armstrong calls this process of discovery, filled with revelations
of past errors in judgement, "disillusioning surprise."4 Armstrong
goes on to say, "Dowell reexamines his erroneous conjectures not to
abandon hypothetical thinking but to project new beliefs. If his
earlier conjectures misled his, he can still only discover truth
through hypothesis. . . ."5 Armstrong's claim is that Dowell,
through continual rethinking, reflecting on the earlier perceptions
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he has had, comes closer and closer to a real sense of truth,
closer to the Husseralian essence of the situation. But does
Dowell ever come to some truth about the apple and its core? Does
Ford allow for some static truth that Dowell could arrive at?
Before answering this question, another discussion of
phenomenology becomes necessary. Earlier a general introduction to
phenomenology was given; now two of the major phenomenological
philosophies must be explained.
Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger were professor and student
in the early part of this century, about the time of the First World
War; however, as time went on, a split became evident between the
two thinkers. Heidegger accepts and appreciates the work of his
teacher, particularly the idea that philosophy needs a new basis
from which to work, but Husserlts basis for the new philosophy is
not radical enough for Heidegger. Husserl creates the phenomenological
method, basing all knowledge on the interaction people have between
themselves and that which surrounds them. For Husserl, the answer
comes to essences. Inside each person, says Husserl, is a certain
essence that describes him or her as a human being, a transcendental
quality of thinking, questioning, and probing that all people are
involved in. After viewing the human creature, Husserl takes
Descartes's famous line and turns it on itself--I am, therefore I
think.
Heidegger, though, believes that this transcendental is not
the true basis for understanding the idea of being. As Pierre
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Thevenaz writes in "What Is Phenomenology?":
In Husserl the • • foundation was expressed in terns of
consciousness. In Heidegger interrogation pushes still
deeper, even below transcendental consciousness, down to
the "foundation of the foundation." And it is already
evident that this "iteration," this redoubling of radicalism
can lead us only to a sort of "void without ground" . . .
toward a nothingness, a nothingness more radical than any
being or than any foundation that is. . . . Fundamental
ontology leap into an ontology of non-being, into a
meontologie.'
The question Heidegger raises is similar to that of the scientist
who asks, "But before creation, before the Big Bang, what was there?"
Heidegger says that Husserl's consciousness is only another of the
phenomena that is interacted with, not the basis of being, not where
creation ease out of. For Heidegger, the true bottom level of
existence is nothingness. There 13 no transcendental in Heideggarian
phenomenology, only pure interaction of phenomena with nothingness.
Two different epistemological theories arise from each of these
two different phenomenologies. First, through Husseralian interaction
of phenomena and the probing mind, people can discover truths, essences.
But in a Heideggarian world, truth is impossible. There can only be
the void at the foundation of learning, interaction between the
world and nothingness. And it is this Heideggarian sense of the
world that gives The Good Soldier its bleak nature.
As mentioned above, Armstrong believes that Dowell approaches
some sense of truth through the reflections on the nine years he has
spent with the Ashburnhams. The book, in fact, is a series of
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Armstrong's "disillusioning surprises." But what is Dowell's final
conclusion about these revelations? Samuel Hynes says that Dowell
comes to accept a plurality of truths,
7 
and Armstrong takes these
pluralities and fits then into an Husseralian construct, concluding
that through his discovery of pluralism, Dowell discovers the essence
of man. But all this disregards the second major epistemological
phrase that runs throughout The Good Soldier. Whenever Dowell raises
any sort of question, he inevitably answers himself by saying, "I
don't know."
The question then becomes what does Dowell's continual asking
without coming to any concrete answer show? To understand Dowell's
musings, his words must be taken at their simplest level. To say
"I don't know," and to continually repeat this phrase, can only show
there is no answer for Dowell to find. The final metaphor Dowell
uses in telling his story, a metaphor describing the young girl
Nancy who has gone insane, but a metaphor which can be applied to
the story as a whole, shows the true state of affairs in The Good 
Soldiers "It is very extraordinary to see the perfect flush of
health on her cheeks, to see the lustre of her coiled black hair,
the poise of the head upon the neck, the grace of the white hands--
and to think that it all means nothing—that it is a picture without
a meaning" (p. 254). No real essence has been discovered. Only a
Heideggarian void rests at the bottom of Ford's bleak story.
One final problem of The Good Soldier needs to be dealt with.
If the novel works as an epistemological study, yet nothing can be
learned, how can Dowell come to any conclusions at all, true or
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false? In part, the answer lies in the work's complete title, The
Good Soldiers A Tale of Passion. Passion runs throughout the novel,
seemingly a driving force impelling most every action the characters
take. But passion. like Dowell's conclusions, implies a universal
truth, an Husseralian essence. How can passion's presence be
explained in a Heideggarian void? A careful examination of The Good 
Soldier's epilogue provides an answer.
Right after using the metaphor of a picture without a meaning,
Dowell concludes his story with a two page explanation of how Teddy
Ashburnhae commits suicide. In this epilogue, Dowell reminds the
reader of Teddy's one particular character trait--his sentimentalises
"Well, Edward was the English gentleman; but he was also, to the
Last, a sentimentalist, whose mind was compounded of indifferent
poems and novels" (pp. 256-257). Universal truths do not make up
Teddy's thought structure, but, instead, his mind has become filled
with words from sentimental novels. In effect, Teddy's Rind becomes
no more than the words he reads. Not only in the epilogue does
Dowell tell the reader that Ashburnham's life is made of nothing more
than words. In an earlier description of Teddy, Dowell says: "For
all good soldiers are sentimentalists—,all good soldiers are of that
typo. Their profession, for one thing, is full of the big words—
'courage,' 'loyalty,"constancy" (pp. 26-27). Passion works as
another of these "big words" by which people live their lives. It
becomes a word game people play. But in a Heideggarian void, it
becomes a game without meaning, an act without purpose, and in effect
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Teddy Ashburnham plays the game of passion throughout the book
without its ever coming to any purposeful end.
The end does arrive, however, with Teddy's suicide, for as
Dowell relates the story, Ashburnham kills himself once he realises
that all his passions have come to nothing. Every woman he has
ever loved has either died or stopped loving him--La Dolciquita never
loved him; Maisie Maiden has been crushed under the weight of her
own luggage; Florence has committed suicide, not as such because
Teddy has fallen in love with another woman, but because Dowell may
have discovered her infidelity; and the final blow, Nancy sends a
telegram that she is having "a rattling good time" (p. 255) now
that she has left the Ashburnhams. The greatest possible hope for
Edward Ashburnham, passion, proves itself to be the greatest possible
fiction. All that Teddy has left is the Heideggarlan void, something
he no longer wishes to face.
Even in Teddy's suicide, Dowell realises this lack of meaning.
No passion exists in this final act, only the end of life: "So long,
old man," says Ashburnhas to Dowell, "I must have a bit of a rest,
you know" (p. 256). Dowell himself finds no meaning to place on the
acts
I didn't know what to say. I wanted to says "God bless
you," for I as also a sentimentalist. But I thought that
perhaps would not be quite English good form, so I trotted
off with the telegram to Leonora. She was quite pleased
with it. (p. 256)
Dowell, by admitting his own sentimentalism, ties himself to Teddy
and all the big words that have made Teddy's life. There is nothing
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to create meaning for any of the characters except the fiction of
words.
And what is the end result of this ill-placed faith in a
fictional passion?
Well, it is over. Not one of us has got what he really
wanted. Leonora wanted Edward, and she has got Rodney
Bayham, a pleasant enough sort of sheep. Florence wanted
Branshaw, and it is I who have bought it froa Leonora. I
didn't really want it; what I wanted mostly was to cease
being a nurse-attendant. Well, I an a nurse-attendants
Edward wanted Nancy Rufford and I have got her. Only she
is mad. It is a queer fantastic world. Why can't people
have what they want? The things were all there to content
everybody; yet everybody has the wrong thing. Perhaps you
can make head or tail of it; it is beyond se. (P. 237)
The only end of all Dowell's reflections, of all the fictions lived
by each of the characters, is nothing.
All of this leaves The Good Soldier to be a very bleak novel.
The final conclusion becomes no conclusion, only a Heideggarian
void. If we were to ask if there can be an answer to the question
of meaning in Ford's tours de force, the answer would not even be a
resounding, "No." Instead, using what is found in The Good Soldier,
all a person can say is, "I don't know."
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Parade's End and the Creation of Man
To this point, Ford Madox Ford has been shown writing fairy
tales affirming the individual over universal driving mechanisms and
novels portraying the bleak void that underlies creation, but is
there a way to reconcile the two? Can Ford accept the importance of
individuals without leaving thee in chaotic nothingness? Most
critics see Parade's End, Ford's tetralogy about World War 1,1 as a
record of the decline and fall of Victorian and Edwardian England
during and after the war. However, Parade's End does not just
record destruction, but also the rebuilding of a new society, one
not based on a naturalistic class system but rather on values seen
earlier in The Queen Who Flew—the importance of individual needs
above and beyond those of society. Unlike The Queen Who Flew, though,
Parade's End recognizes and uses the void of nothingness as the
foundation for creating individual meaning.2
One of the best explorations of Parade's End, James Heldman's
"The Last Victorian Novel," discusses Ford's use of literary technique
to parallel Victorian society's downfall and the rise of modern
man. Heldman writes*
Perhaps the most Victorian feature of Parade's End is the
emphasis Ford places on the extent to which individual
identity is or can be defined in relation to a community. • •
More significantly, however, in Parade's End Christopher
Tietjens moves from a vestige' sense of community to
isolation. The process and the result make it an epitome
of the experience of modern man and an archetypal modern
nove1.3
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As Heldman points out, Parade's End shows the movement from a
Victorian ideal of community to a modern ideal of individual man
and parallels this thematic movement through shifting literary
techniques, starting with the omniscient narrator of Victorian
novels, ending with the interior narrative--what sight be called
stream-of-consciousness--of modern works. Beyond the shift in both
literary and thematic emphasis, however, lies a metaphysical change,
the decline of eighteenth century mechanism and simultaneous rise
of phenomenological individualism. Before exploring this change,
one more dip into phenomenological philosophy becomes necessary.
So far, the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger have been
explored, but now a third step becomes necessary to understand the
full range of possibilities within a phenomenological view, the step
Jean-Paul Sartre takes in his work Being and Nothingness.  Sartre
begins where Heidegger leaves off, with an underlying void,
nothingness. However, Sartre changes the idea of void as pure
interplay between mind and phenomena to a void even more radical.
In Heidegger, existence means an empty slate for experience to mark,
but only marks without meaning. In Sartre, though, even the slate
is denied, allowing existence to be built out of nothing.
The method Sartre uses to show this, the most radical of
phenomenological reductions, is nihilation--the process of isolating
each object out from its environment, thereby showing the object
as non-essential, non-foundational. Nihilation begins with the
simplest objects, isolating out the material things of the world.
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As I write, I begin to isolate one particular object out from the
rest--my mug of tea becomes a distinguishable presence on my desk
top. By distinguishing the mug from the clutter, I have isolated
the mug through nihilation--by destroying its particular importance
to being an integral part of the desk top's cluttered existence.
By nihilation, I can remove any object from being essential to
existence. I can isolate my desk from ay living room, my living
room from my apartment, my apartment from the duplex, etc., until
I have finally nihilated all objects from the essence of existence,
leaving a base of nothingness.
Nihilation affects not only physical objects; mental processes
can be separated out as well. even the act of intending an object,
the idea central to Husserl's discovery of essential being, can be
isolated through nihilation, removing all essences as foundations
upon which existence can be built. This is the real idea behind
Sartre's radical twist of thought, to show that being preceeds
essence, that there is nothing a priori to existence. Existence
becomes nothingness. Beyond nothingness, all else is added. The
implication Sartre gives to his radical nothingness works differently
from that of Heidegger's blank slate. Nothingness now implies that
if there is to be any conscious existence at all (and all people
end up participating in some form of conscious existence), then this
existence is neither found essence as in Husserl, or meaningless
interplay between man and the cosmos as in Heidegger, but instead,
conscious existence becomes a creative act--people creating their
own meanings out of nothingness.
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With people as creative beings, they become free--free from
mechanistic preconceptions and free to create meaning for life,
essence, as they see fit. Freedom lifts the control over life the
individual mind once held, since the ego has been removed as a
foundational base for existence. "The freedom which reveals itself
to us in anguish," writes Sartre in Being and Nothingness, "can be
characterised by the existence of that nothing which insinuates
itself between motives and act. It is not because I am free that
my act is not subject to the determination of motives; on the
contrary, the structure of my motives as ineffective is the condition
of my freedom" (p. 34). Two final directions must be explored 3n
light of Sartre's words--the importance of act over motive or thought,
and anguish, or the pessimistic nature of Sartrian freedom.
First, freedom from all external and internal restraints leaves
one feature to create meaning with--the act. According to Sartre,
action defines people. What people do, what they project from
nothingness, becomes the foundation for meaning; all else is fiction.
Because only physical manifestations of thought--actions,are important
in the creation of meaning, Sartrian philosophy will say that Jesus's
idea that thinking about adultery is as sinful as the physical act
of adultery no longer stands. Only the action matters.
Second, for Sartre, freedom does not carry the joyful connotation
people traditionally associate with the word, but instead freedom acts
as a prison in which humankind is caught. Freedom comes only when
people have nihilated all preconceived essences, foundations to their
existence, and allows them to create new essences for their lives.
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But new essences are still essences, and people, by creating new
essences, become trapped again by preconceived notions--they create
fictions about the future before living in it. In other words,
Sartre's freedom acts as a prison, a Catch-22, an inescapable
endless loop of creation, nihilation, creation, nihilation.5 The
endless loop, because it shows the futility of finding a true meaning
for life, creates anguish--the freedom of life becomes a prison from
which there is no escape. Through freedoa, hope for true meaning is
lost.
What does Sartre's phenomenological existentialisa do, then, to
the sneaker? First, through isolating nihilation it destroys any
foundational meaning the shoe might have had. From there, the truly
free individual, one who has gone through personal nihilation and
individual redefinition, takes the sneaker and acts on it--not to
give the sneaker any real meaning, but rather to give the individual
meaning. Even if this individual creates aeaning for the sneaker,
inherent in that meaning comes anguish and pain, because meaning
can only be fictions it can not last. Meaning for the sneaker must
change because of freedom, and therein lies the endless loop--meaning
is found, nihilated, found, nihilated, found, nihilated. . . . And
from the endless loop, the individual who acts on the sneaker takes
on the anguish and absurdity the endless loop holds.
Before going further, it needs to be pointed out that Ford's
prograa in Parade's End is not a perfect parallel of Sartre's
phenomenological existentialisa. Though similar, the two programs
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divide at crucial points, in particular with the physical nature of
the act and with the anguish Sartre's version of freedom creates.
For Ford, the act must be defined in a larger sense than in Sartre
and include the mental act: and freedom for Ford does not seen
heated anguish, but instead holds no specific emotional ties over
people. Freedom is cold, unworried passion.
Ford does parallel Sartre in one major point, though--nihilism.
Parade's End portrays not so much Edwardian society's downfall, but
the rise of modern individualism by following Christopher Tietjens,
the modern individual who isolates himself from society in order to
define his own being. Tietjens moves from the community experience
of working in England's pre-war bureaucracy to the pastoral solitude
of country living, and, through the war, Tietjens discovers the true
depth of nothingness shown by nihilism. Nihilism plays a particularly
important role in Parade's End's second novel, No More Parades.
where Tietjens, working as a supply officer during the war, receives
word that his wife, Sylvia, has come to France in order to settle
affairs with Christopher. Learning that Sylvia has put up at a
nearby hotel and waits to see him, Tietjens sits on his bunk and
tries to decipher his wife's present actions and their meaning,
coming to this final conclusion:
What in the world was he doing? Now? With all this
introspection? . . . Rang it all, he was not justifying
himself. . . . He had acted perfectly correctly as far as
Sylvia was concerned. Not perhaps to Miss Wannop. . . .
Why, if he, Christopher Tietjens of Groby, had the need to
justify himself, what did it stand for to be Christopher
Tietjens of Groby? That was the unthinkable thought. (p. 350)6
L40
Christopher comes to the realization that he is nothing more than a
created being, created by the conventions of society. To justify
existing as Christopher Tietjens of Grotty becomes an impossible task.
Christopher in his role of landed gentry has been isolated, nihilated,
leaving simply Christopher Tietjens.
As the war continues around his, Christopher goes further and
further inside himself, in a sense making his own trip into hell,
finding that the only important meaning in life is what people make
of themselves, the self-made character. After the creative act,
all else ends as meaningless word plays
Levin exclaised:
"Just heavens! What a pessimist you are:"
Tietjens said: IresiE't you see that that is optimism?"
"But," Levin said, "we're being beaten out of the
field. . . . You don't know how desperate things are."
Tietjens said:
"Oh, I know pretty well. As soon as this weather
breaks we're probably done."
"We can't," Levin said, "possibly hold them. Not
possibly."
"But success or failure," Tietjens said, "have nothing
to do with the credit of a story. And consideration of the
virtues of humanity does not omit the other side. If we
lose, they win. If success is necessary to your idea of
virtue--virtus--they then provide the success instead of
ourselves. But the thing is to be able to stick to the
integrity of your character, whatever earthquake sets the
house tumbling over your head. . . . That. thank God,
we're doing. . . ." (p. 454)
Like Sartre, Christopher, and Ford through Christopher, sees that
success and failure are static goals, impossible and therefore
unimportant. Instead, action becomes important, the creation and
definition of self, simply because action is not static but necessarily
temporal. Christopher has gone through self-nihilation and risen as
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an individual whose life takes on meaning only through his individual
actions.
An interesting contrast to Tietjens is Sylvia, who has the
same opportunity to become an individual, but instead falls deeper
Into the trap of being defined by society. On the evening Sylvia and
Christopher meet at the hotel near Christopher's post in France,
something happens to her. At the hotel, though surrounded by people
and noise, Christopher appears quiet, withdrawn. Sylvia, though,
seems acutely aware of all that surrounds her—the newly promoted
ex-Sergeant-Major Cowley, the sleeping General Campion, the dancing
in the next room, and above all, the overly loud gramaphones
She screamed blasphemies that she was hardly aware of
knowing. She had to scream against the noises she was no
more responsible for the blasphemy than if she had lost
her identity under an anaesthetic. She had lost her
identity. • • • She was one of this croZT (p. 440
Sylvia, unlike Tietjens, defines herself less and less as an Individual
and more and more as part of society. Instead of isolating herself
from other people, instead of self-nihilation, Sylvia requires other
people to give her life meaning.
Reflecting on the works discussed earlier, The Queen Who Flew 
and The Good Soldier, a pattern begins to emerge. Like the Queen
before meeting the bat, Sylvia defines herself through outside forces
and therefore works as a purely social creature. Just as the Queen
continually accepts the "supposing's" of others, Sylvia defines
herself through others' words, the strongest of these being those of
Father Consett, the priest who told Sylvia that the one thing she
would not be able to handle would be Christopher's falling in love
with another woman. "She tried to rouse herself," Ford writes, "and
said: He knew me. . . . Damn it, he knew me! . . . What's vulgarity
to me, Sylvia Tietjens born Satterthwaite? I do what I want and
that's good enough for anyone. Except a priest" (p. 415). Sylvia
allows herself to be controlled by an outside force, the memory of
Father Consett. Christopher, meanwhile, by allowing himself to think
the unthinkable, that being Christopher Tietjens of Groby means
nothing, has actually freed himself, has moved beyond supposings.
However, even if Christopher has moved into the world of
self-definition, a significant difference exists between it and the
Queen's world--the necessity of nihilation to gain freedom. The
Queen achieves the goal of individualism without destruction,
Christopher only through nihilation, by passing through the deep,
meaningless nothing that Dowell has discovered at the end of The
Good Soldier. Unlike Dowell. however, Christopher lifts himself up
to rebuild a new world through nihilation. Christopher defines
himself. Dowell becomes unable to reach meaning without social
relationships. The themes of the earlier works are fully developed,
but now cone to light in the presence of a Sartrian created being.
As mentioned above, Ford does not follow the complete Sartrian
program. For Sartre, the act has purely physical connotations, but
Ford will accept a wider definition for action, closer to that of
Henry James in "The Art of Fiction," where James says that what
occurs in the mind, the act of consciousness, is as interesting and
important a subject for a story as any physical action that can be
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portrayed.7 Parade's End concludes with psychological drama, The
Last Post, where, instead of Christopher or Sylvia, the reader
watches the mind of Mark Tietjens, Christopher's older brother, as
Mark lives through the last afternoon of his self-imposed paralysis
and muteness. Inside Mark's mind, the action of redefining an
individual's life occurs. What Mark sees, thinks, feels in the few
hours of an afternoon shows the redefining of self not through brute
force and bold movement, but through subtle mental maneuvering of
his isolated, nihilated self.
The other difference between Ford and Sartre, the emotional
nature of a truly free person, shows Mark's self-created being and
the difference between heated anguish and cool, unworried passion.
Anguish plays an important role in Sartre's pessimism, anguish over
the fact that since people are free they can never attain a true,
static resting place, a final truth that will work for all time.
But, as seen by Ford, the modern being seeks nonstant movement, desires
it. Mark Tietjens silences himself in The Last Post not because the
world is changing around his, but because the world refuses to change,
refuses to move. As Ford writes:
Well, that was not his, Mark Tietjens' fault. He had
given the nation the Transport it needed: the nation should
have found the food. They had not, so the children had long
thin legs and wristbones that protruded on pipe-stems. All
that generation! . . . No fault of his! He had managed
the Transport as it should be managed. His department had.
His own department, built up by himself from junior temporary
clerk to senior permanent official; he had built it up, from
the day of his entrance thirty years ago, to the day of his
resolution never more to speak a word. (P. 679)
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Mark was a man of action, and through self-imposed paralysis, though
in an ironic way, still acts. But Mark's actions cone not froa
Sartre's anguish, but frost cold passion. Ford continues writing
about Mark:
Not yet stir a finger! He had to be in this world, in
this nation. Let thee care for his, for he was done with
this. . . . He knew the sire and dam of every horse from
Biclipse to Perlmutter. That was enough for his, He had
interests enough! (pp. 679-680)
Mark's retaliation is not angry or frustrated but cool, like his
paralysis. The idea of a coldly passionate man is not exclusively
Ford's but can be found in Yeats's "The Fisherman" and Wallace Stevens's
concept of the glass san.
8 
However, in Parade's End, cold passion
has actual manifestation—the nihilated and recreated Mark and
Christopher Tietjenses.
So where has Ford wound up? He began. in The Queen Who Flew,
by affirming the importance of the individual, continued by discovering
the Heideggarian void in The Good Soldier, and ends by forcing
people to redefine themselves fros the void in Parade's Bud. It is
not unimportant that Ford winds up where he began, in a pastoral
and anarchic society with people free to define themselves in whatever
way they wish.9 Parade's End, however, provides a fuller sense of
freedom than the fairy tale through the tetralogy's use of nihilation
and nothingness, opening the world to the wide range of infinite
possibilities. The existential stoicisa, though it appears bleak,
can be equally as well slanted to the direction of a rich and full
individual life. Ford, in his pluralistic world view, leaves the
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final creation of meaning, optimistic, pessimistic, or neutral, to
the reader.10
Notes
1 Consisting of the novels Some Do Not. . . . (1924), No More
Parades (1925), A Man Could Stand Up (1926), and The Last P70:77(1928).
2 Parade's End will be treated as a tetralogy despite disagreement
over the inclusion of tho final book, The Last Post, as an integral
part of the work. Since The Last Post deals with characters and
situations developed in the first three books, and is the last heard
of the Tietjens family, it seems fair to discuss it in light of its
predecessors. All four works are printed in one volume: Parade's 
End (New York: Vintage, 1979). All further references to this work
appear in the text.
3 "The Last Victorian Novel: Technique and Theme in Parade's End."
Twentieth Century Literature. 18 (1972), 272-273.
4 Being and Nothingness: An Ontological Essay, Hazel E. Barnes,
trans. (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.).
5 Sartre's endless loop becomes possible through the nature of
time and mutability. Sartre will say that the loop works because
freedom is the freedom to transform, and the only transformation
people are capable of is the creation of meanings--fictional meanings.
6
All ellipses in this and following passages from Parade's End
and other works by Ford, unless otherwise noted, are Ford's own.
7 "The Art of Fiction," in The Theory of Fiction: Henry James,
James E. Miller, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972),
pp. 40-42.
8 The Fisherman": "A man who does not exist, / A man who is
but a dream i / And cried, 'Before I an old / I shall have written his
one / Poem maybe as cold / And as passionate as the dawn.'" (11. 35-40),
and "Asides on the Oboe": "The glass man, cold and numbered, dewily
cries, / 'Thou art not August unless I make thee so'" (11. 21-22).
9 In neither work does pastoral mean life without trouble. The
Queen Who Flew concludes with the Queen and the young farmer walking
"hand in hand up the tranquil valley or in among the storms on the
hill crests. . ." (my ellipses). And the last seen of Christopher
Tietjens, he is being scolded by Valentine for having forgotten some
important prints inside a .*r at the dealer's.
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A siailar pastoral retreat can be found in Ernest Hemingway's
A Farewell to Aps, published in 1929. The cost interesting aspects
of this parallel are, first thematically, that both are results of
nihilistic experiences during World War I, and, biographically, during
the 1920's, Hemingway worked for Ford as a reader in Paris for the
transatlantic review.
The Neutral Authors
Ford Madox Ford as Literary Critic
In 1936, a few years before his death, Ford Madox Ford wrote
Portraits Piton Life, menories and criticism about literary figures
Ford had known. Within this work, Ford's long-standing disagreement
dith H. G. Wells about the artist's role in society can be founds
What we contended was that the world could be saved only
by the Arts; Mr. Wells and his followers proclaimed that
the trick could only be done by Science. What, secondly,
we contended was that if you intended to practice the Arta
you had better know something of the mental processes of
how works of art are produced; the eneny forces proclaimed,
with drums a-beat and banners waving, that to be an artist
of any sort you had only to put some vine leaves in your
hair, take pen or brush and paper or canvas and dip pen or
brush in inkstand or paint pot, and Art would flow from
your fingertips. The opposing doctrines were, in short,
those of Inspiration and of Conscious Art.'
One these that has run throughout Ford's work has been the absence
of determinism, allowing, even forcing, people to find their own
meanings for themselves and life. Ford and Wells argue the place,
in bsth theme and creation of art, for determinism--Science or
Inspiration -and the conscious act--Conscious Art.2 But what does
Conscious Art swan to Ford? How does a writer work without the
safety net of heaven (or hell) sent Inspiration?
One place to look for this answer would be in the ideas of
reader-response criticism, a critical theory arising out of the
phenoneaology that has been attached to Ford thus far. One of the
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first bases of reader-response criticism is behaviorism, the
psychology of learned response. Through behaviorism, deterministic
archetypal psychologies such as those of Freud and Jusg can be
discarded. In his 1923 essay Women and Men, Ford lays out sone
basics for behaviorism by rejecting universals as noa-txistent
abstractions having no true universal value. "The view that the
English woman has of 'a Man,'" writes Ford, "nay differ from those
of the French, the Germans or the Russians, but it is nevertheless
largely a view of an object that never existed-,a view of an
abstraction."3 For Ford, the abstract archetype of Man (and he says
the sane for archetypal Woman) works as fiction, created by people
for their own purposes.
But whore does the idea of abstract Man cos: from in the first
place? Ford lays blame on, or gives credit to, the word. In
writing on the original source for the English ideal of Woman, Ford
Says:
The Englishman's mind is of course made up entirely_of
quotations. A person entirely without intellect himself,
he is the man of all the world who best knows his poets.
And the poets best known to him are of course Shakespeare
and the English translators of the Bible. When his
quotations do not come from either Shakespeare or the
Bible he thinks they do, so that it comes to the sans
thing. (p. 27)
Just as Ford describes Teddy Ashburnhan as "full of the big words—
'courage,' loyalty,"constancy." or else describes the queen as
made of other people's "supposings." all people are created beings,
made up of the words they experience in lifo.4 Is The Good Soldier,
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all the reader knows of Dowell are his words; the reader is never
presented with an objective description of this highly subjective
first-person narrator. In The Good Soldier, the reader must accept
the "supposings" of another person to form a picture of reality. In
Parade's End, words play a similar role only with a different effect.
Mark Tietjens protests the stupidity of Britan's inaction not only
by imposing paralysis on himself, but also auteness. Mark protests
by refusing to use the tool by which people define themselves--words.
If Ford places words in an exalted position, what becomes the
artist's role in the system? Ford answers in his introduction to
Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell To Arms, from which I quote a rather
lengthy passage:
The au --the achieveaent--of the great prose writer is to
use words so that they shall seem new and alive because of
their juxtaposition with other words. This gift Hemingway
has supremely. Any sentence of his taken at random will
hold your attention. And irresistibly. It does not matter
where you take it.
I was under the canvas with guns. They smelled
cleanly of oil and grease. I lay and listened to the
rain on the canvas and the clicking of the car over
the rails. There was a little light case through and
I lay and I looked at the guns.
You could not begin that first sentence and not finish
the passage.
That is the great part of this author's gift. Yet it
is not only "gift." You cannot throw yourself into a frame
of mind and just write to get that effect. Your mind has
to choose each word and your ear has to test it until by
long disciplining of mind and ear you can no longer go
wrong.
That disciplining through which you aunt put yourself
is all the more difficult in that it must be gone through
in solitude. You cannot watch the man next to you in the
ranks smartly manipulating his sido-armm nor do you hear
any word of command by which to time yourself.
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On the other hand a writer holds a reader by his
temperament. That is his true "gift"--what he receives
from whoever sends his into the world. It arises from how
you look at things. If you look at and render things so
that they appear new to the reader you will hold his
attention. If what you give his appears familiar or half
familiar his attention will wander. Hemingway's use of
the word "cleanly" is an instance of what I have been
saying. The guns smelled cleanly of oil and grease. Oil
and grease are not usually associated in the aind with
clean smell. Yet at the minutest reflection you realise
that the oil and grease an the clean tutted of the big guns
are not dirt. So the adverb is just. You have had a
aoment of surprise and then your knowledge is added to.
The word "author" Reams "someone who adds to your
consciousness. "5
This one passage contains the three aain concerns to Ford's
conception of arts the relationship of the author to the word, the
relationship of the reader to the word, and the relationship of the
author to the reader.
The first relationship to be developed, that between writers
and their words, Ford establishes on a theory prevalent among
novelists of the early twentieth century, the reaoval of authorial
presence fros a work. The most faaous of these theorists, Uses
Joyce through the character Stephen Dedalus in A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, explains the role of the artist to be "like
the God of creation," remaining "within or behind or beyond or above
his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent,
paring his fingernails."6 For Joyce, the author stands back in order
to allow the audience opportunity to revel in the work's truth--
objective reality without interference from an artist's subjective
viewpoint. Ford will agree with Joyce to a large extent. The
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removal of the or, accordine to Ford, allows the objective
presentation of the world. "The one thing that you can not do,"
writes Ford in Joseph Conrad: A Personal Remembrance, "is to
propagandise, as author, for any cause. You must not, as author,
utter any views: above all you must not fake any events. You must
not, however humanitarian you may be, over elaborate the fear felt
by a coursed rabbit. . . . Your business with the world is rendering,
not alteration."7 This movement from telling to showing, alteration
to rendering, can be seen in the movement Ford mikes from omniscient
narrator to stream-of-consciousness in Parade's End a movement
characterised by a changing concentration from the author's view to
the character's. The removal of authorial presence can be seen even
sore in The Good Soldier where Dowell says all and Ford never speaks
to the reader directly. Ford plays the role of detached author in
the same way the phenomenological philosopher plays the role of
detached observer, to experience life in its rawest state before
giving it meaning. Through this basic philosophic difference
between Joyce and Ford--Joyce believes in presented universal truths,
Ford in created ones--the ultimate reason the detached relationship
between author and work tikes on a different signifigance for each
writer.
For Joyce, objectivity in rendering allows the reader to view
and experience truth. For Ford, the reader creates a new truth.
First. as Ford writes, "the general effect of a novel must be the
general effect that life makes on mankind." If this is the ease,
then the novel must render life as it appears to the mind. "We saw
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that life did not narrate," continues Ford about himself and Conrad,
"but made impressions on our brains. We in turn, if we wished to
produce on you an effect of life, must not narrate but render . . .
impressions" (pp. 72-73). But what end results cone fron renderings?
If Ford, as does Sartre, believes in the creation of meaning, then
the result must be to stimulate speculations within the mind of the
reader rather than to show existing truths; for existence must
preceed essence. Being comes before meaning.8 The role of the
writer becomes, then, not one so such as creator, for that duty will
be left for the reader, but instead the writer becomes a renderer,
painting pictures which help readers create new realities within
their minds.
The second relationship to be explored grows directly out of
the first, that between the reader and the word. Ford defines this
relationship with one word--surprise. "We agreed," says Ford, still
talking about his literary partnership with Conrad, "that the one
quality that gave interest to Art was the quality of surprise" (p. 78).
Surprise actively includes the reader in the process of art, as
implied by Ford's discussion of the clean smell of oil and grease on
the guns. However, before discussing Ford's idea of surprise and
the reader, what surprise is not needs to be explored.
Surprise does not shock readers, like sneaking up on a friend
and screaming "Boo!" Instead of disturbing the reader through
vulgarity or other foul insinuations, what generally gets tented
shock value, Ford includes a wider range of methods under shock. As
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Ford explains in a 1903 letter to H. G. Wells:
By the by.: I lament to see you fall into the error of
upholding "Elisabethanism." That sort of thing is the
curse of modern English. What we want is to use our
vernacular so skilfully that words, precious or obsolete,
will not stick out or impede a reader. . . . No, sirs
their vocabulary seems better than ours because we are
creatures of association--precisely because we consider a
ploughed field "Nature." We have been taught to consider
Elisabethan words as "positical"--and so we do. And we all
of us have in us a little touch of the pedants we like to
twist things round to show off. But really it's such better
to write "not pertinent" and to keep "impertinent" for its
present use. . . . Consider, oh my friend, these points--
for, vary firstly, you make the sense of language so
important a part of your scheme. What we want is to
cultivate that "sense" than to increase our vocabularies
with obsolete words that are attractive mainly because they
are allusivo.9
Shock value comes froa overly pedantic as well as vulgar forms. In
either case, shock value draws attention to the author and has little
or nothing to do with surprise in the reader.
If surprise is not shock, then what is it? The ability to
inform, says Ford. James L. Kinneavy, in his A Theory of Discourse,
speaks about the need for unpredictability in words if they are to
inform, for already known or easily predictable statements "come as
no surprise," provide no learning value.
10 
The words presented in
a text, according to Ford, must infora readers by surprising them
with ideas and thoughts never encountered before. Ford outlines the
method of surprise in a 1914 essay, "On Impressionism," where,
speaking of the reader, Ford says:
You will seek to capture his interest; you will seek to
hold his interest. You will do this by methods of surprise,
.9+
of fatigue, by passages of sweetness in your language, by
passages suggesting the sudden and brutal shock of suicide.
You will give his passages of dulness, so that your bright
effects may seem more bright; you will alternate, you will
dwell for a long time upon an intimate point; you will
seek to exasperate so that you say better enchant. You 1,
will, in short, employ all the devices of the prostitute. '
Ford's methods are developed in order to drive the reader forward
through a process of continual change and redefinition.
Wolfgang leer, in his seminal work on reader-response criticism,
The Implied Reader, reiterates the idea of surprise, though in a more
academic tone than Fords
The individual sentences not only work together to shade
in what is to come; they also form an expectation in this
regard. Husserl calls this expectation "pre-intentions."
As this structure is characteristic of all sentence
correlatives, the interaction of these correlatives will
not be a fulfillment of the expectation so such as a
continual modification of it.te
As a text moves forward, it continually forces readers to take new
information into their thought structures, causing a necessary
change to accommodate the new information. The relationship between
the reader and the word becomes interactive, a joining together to
find meaning, continually changing meaning.
Through this interactive relationship, art returns to the
concept mentioned in the first chapter--art needs an audience in
order to be art. Continuing in The Implied Reader, leer writes,
"The product of this creative activity is what we sight call the
virtual dimension of the text, which endows it with its reality.
This virtual dimension is not the text itself, nor is it the imagination
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of the readers it is the coming together of text and imagination"
(p. 279). Art works as the coming together of reader and text, the
two acting as one in a process of creating a new reality. Ford's
way of describing this relationship between reader and word becomes,
"A picture should cone out of its frame and seize the spectator."13
The active nature of the relationship between art work and audience
epitomizes Ford's aesthetic as well as reader-response criticism and
phenomenology. Work and audience come together to find a new reality,
a new meaning.
The third and final relationship, then, is that between writers
and readers, a relationship Ford has already described as that found
between prostitutes and their johns. But what does this description
really imply? The main implication is that writers, in the terms of
modern management techniques, work as "facilitators." Instead of
forcing knowledge down readers' throats, Ford believes that writers
must present worlds where readers can discover meaning for themselves.
To characterize Ford's idea of author and audience, one word stands
above all--humbleness. Unlike Joyce, who removes himself from the
text to stand above it. Ford removes himself in order to stand below
the text. The text, for Ford, has become Iser's virtual text, the
interaction between a reader and words; therefore, if the virtual
text acts as the true presentation of art, the author has no right
to stand above it, claiming to be indifferent to or better than the
creation of meaning present in the process of art. In another .
lengthy but important passage from "On Impressionism," Ford writes:
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But ono point is very important. The artist can never
write to satisfy himself--to get, as the saying is,
something off the chest. He must not writs propaganda
which it is his desire to write; he must not write rolling
periods, the production of which gives his a smooth feeling
in his digestive organs or wherever it is. He must always
write to satisfy that other fellow--that other fellow who
has too clear an intelligence to let his attention be
captured or his mind deceived by special pleadings in favor
of any given dogma. You must not write so as to improve
him, since he is a much better fellow than yourself, and
you must not write so as to influence him, since he is a
granite rock, a peasant intelligence, the gnarled bole of a
sempiternal oak, against which you dash yourself in vain.
(p. 54)
The writer, according to Ford, works dilligently to present clear,
believable pictures, as objectively as possible, for readers to
interact with as they would the physical world, allowing them to
experience and change. "The word 'author' means 'someone who adds
to your consciousness."
Ford, then, is one of the first literary artists to consciously
subdue his own personality and his subject to the importance of the
reader. Behind this move in literary technique lies a firmly founded
philosophical ideal--individual beings who create meanings for
themselves. The author has no right to subdue those individuals to
a set of preconceived ideas that are only created fictions. Writers,
according to Ford, have no right to impose their own "supposings" on
the minds of others, but instead must allow their audiences to create
supposings of their own. In fact, Ford advocates pluralism, a world
filled with infinite meanings, each created by a different individual.
And pluralism does not work simply as a device used to draw readers
into a work, but extends to all facets of art, including the creation
of art works. In Joseph Conrad, Ford eaphasises the point of plurality
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by italicizing an entire passage on the subject:
But these two writers were not unaware--were not unaware--
IgagFe me—CaNnalanrods or-WM.17g novels. They were
not rigid even in their own methods. They were sensible 
to the fact that comproaise is at all times necessary to
execution of a work of art. p:77)
Ford admits that no one method, not even pluralism, fits all situations
and works best at creating all works of art. In other words, by
refusing to set any strict standards at all for art, Ford creates the
ultimate plurality, one that accepts all theories, even non-pluralistic
theories, of art and life.
What has Ford done, in the end, for art and for the novel in
particular? First, he has moved the novel into the realm of phenomenology
by removing the necessity of universal truths in either writing or
interpreting a work. The author is neutralized, allowing the words
an objective presentation. Secondly, by creating a tension of surprise
between the reader and the word, Ford moves art from the didactic
position of showing the reader truths to the new position of learring
through an active process of creation. The reader's consciousness
is added to by creating meanings out of surprising juxtapositions
rather than through the reader's being told what truth is. Finally,
by standing below the words he has written, Ford has put the emphasis
in art on the act of appreciation, the interaction of the reader and
the work, the virtual text, anticipating the concerns of reader-response
criticism, the critical approach which will later arise out of the
ideas of phenomenology. Ford, through his idea of the neutral author
has given art to the audience. As he writes in "On Impressionises
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It is in short no pleasant kind of job to be a conscious
artist. You won't have any vine-leaves in your poor old
hair; you won't Just dash your quill into an inexhaustable
ink-well and pour out fine frenzies. No, you will be just
the skilled workman doing his job with drill or chisel or
mallet. And you will get precious little out of it. Only
just at times, when you coae again to look at sose work of
yours that you have quite forgotten, you will say, "Why,
that is rather well done." That is all. (PP. 54-55)
Notes
1 Portraits From Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 107-108.
2 Ford uses the same imagery quite often for those of the "enemy
camp"; in Portraits From Life, Ford also calls Theodore Drieser a man
of Science and accuses his of the same faults as Wells;
I represent, as the reader will by this time no doubt have
observed, the novelists who believe that there is a way of
doing things as opposed to the novelists of genius. These
last set vine-leaves in their hairs, grasp pens as large as
weavers' beams, and with enormous strokes pen polyphonic
rhapsodies, accusing us aeanwhile of carving ingenious
patterns with tooth picks on peachstones . . . or of being
poets. . . . For when Mr. Drieser wishes finally to indicate
that I an a sort of fusionleas village imbecile he says;
"You're a poet. • • • That's what you are. A regular
poet."
Naturally I retort:
"It's you who are the poet," and so get under way. (p. 165)
3 Women and Men (Paris; Three Mountains Press, 1923), p. 37.
4 Words, it will be noted, are more than simply letters strung
together and printed on a page, but are also oral or else visual
presentations of ideas in forms other than writing--similar to the
idea of signifiers in modern critical theory.
5 Introd., A Farewell To Arms, by Ernest Hemingway, in Critical 
Writing* of Ford Madox Ford, Frank MacShane, ed. (Lincoln; University
of Nebraska Prose, 1964), pp. 133-134.
6 A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New York: Viking, 1968),
p. 215,
7 J0801.1 Conrad; A. Personal Reaeabrance (London; Duckworth, 1924);
rpt. in Crit oal Writings, pp. 86-87. Ellipses are ay own, not Ford's.
59
8
French novelist/film maker Alain Robbe-Grillet explains this
new stance for the novel in the essay "A Future for the Novel" (1956s
rpt. in his For  a New Novels Essays on Fiction, Richard Hower, trans.
[New York, Grove Press, 1965), p. 21):
In this future universe of the novel, gestures and objects
will be there before being something; and they will still
be there afterwards, hard, unalterable, eternally present,
mocking their own "meaning," that meaning which vainly
tries to reduce then to the role of precarious tools, of a
temporary and shameful fabric woven exclusively-,and
deliberately—by the superior human truth expressed in it,
only to cast out this awkward auxiliary into immediate
oblivion and darkness.
9 Letter to H. G. Wells, 1903, in Critical Writings, pp. 94-95.
10 A Theory of Discourse (New York* Norton, 1981), p. 93.
11 "On Impressionisa," Poetry and Drama, 2 (1914), 161-175, 323-
334; rpt. in Critical WritingS, P. 54.
12 The Iaplied Readers Patterns of Coamunication in Prose Fiction
frost Bunyan to Beckett (Baltimore* The John Hopkins University Press,
1974), p. 278.
13 "On Impressionism," p. 48.
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